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The Polymorphism of Crime Scene Investigation: an Exploratory Analysis 
of the influence of Crime and Forensic Intelligence on decisions made by 
Crime Scene Examiners 
Abstract 
A growing body of scientific literature recurrently indicates that crime and forensic 
intelligence influence how crime scene investigators make decisions in their practices.  
This study scrutinises further this intelligence-led crime scene examination view. It analyses 
results obtained from two questionnaires. Data have been collected from 9 chiefs of 
Intelligence Units (IUs) and 73 Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) working in forensic science 
units (FSUs) in the French speaking part of Switzerland (6 cantonal police agencies).   
Four salient elements emerged: (1) the actual existence of communication channels between 
IUs and FSUs across the police agencies under consideration; (2) most CSEs take into 
account crime intelligence disseminated; (3) a differentiated, but significant use by CSEs in 
their daily practice of this kind of intelligence; (4) a probable deep influence of this kind of 
intelligence on the most concerned CSEs, specially in the selection of the type of 
material/trace to detect, collect, analyse and exploit.   
These results contribute to decipher the subtle dialectic articulating crime intelligence and 
crime scene investigation, and to express further the polymorph role of CSEs, beyond their 
most recognised input to the justice system. Indeed, they appear to be central, but implicit, 
stakeholders in intelligence-led style of policing.     
Keywords: crime analysis, forensic intelligence, intelligence-led policing, repetitive crimes, 
scene of crime officers, crime scene investigation 
  
 
2 / 20 
 
1. Introduction 
Police in western countries have progressively moved towards intelligence-led models of 
policing. The reality of this trend has been intensively studied, leading to contrasted 
observations [1, 2]. It is however generally not contested that intelligence-led policing 
constitutes a dominant stream in terms of model of security, by promoting a proactive and 
informed approach to security problems [3]. The role of forensic science and crime scene 
investigation in such models is much less scrutinised despite evident signs of their potential or 
actual impact on practices and decision-making processes [4-10].  
Recently, some authors have proposed a framework for crime scene investigation in order to 
explicit this perspective [11-13]. Mostly focused on high volume and repetitive crimes, this 
approach extends however to all forms of crimes, including serious crimes. Consequently, this 
paper uses indifferently terms such as scene of crime officer, crime scene examiner (CSE) or 
crime scene investigator for referring to professionals whose function is to investigate crime 
scenes (i.e. the space delineated by the supposed dispersion of the material exchanged during 
an assumed litigious activity), whatever their seriousness.  
This framework postulates at least three levels of knowledge influencing crime scene 
examination: 
1. The physical level focuses on the material exchanged between the scene and the offender. It 
concerns the physical substrate on which the activity took place. It integrates, for instance, 
knowledge on typical substances transferred, mechanisms for transfer or persistence of the 
material on a surface according to physical circumstances. It considers the divisibility of 
matter [14]. Knowledge about the existence, potential and limits of methods and tools for 
detecting (often latent) marks, for preserving and collecting them completes this level. 
Forensic science focuses on this level.  It provides most of models, methods, and tools. More 
often than not, standard operating procedures are supposed to make this knowledge 
operational [11]. 
2. The situational level relates to the interpretation of the immediate physical and social 
context surrounding the particular activity. It refers to crime opportunity theories [15]. The 
aim is to determine circumstances, specificities of victims/targets in a specific place and at a 
specific time, which may have influenced the modus operandi of the perpetrator. It supports 
thus the development of hypotheses on the activity, which, in turns, indicate possible contact 
points that may have caused exchange of material with the substrate [16, 17]. 
3. The crime intelligence level refers to knowledge on the crime environment and how 
underlying modus operandi recurrently detected in analogue situations influence, in a 
common way, exchanges of matters. It is actionable knowledge for CSEs, because it orients 
the investigation at the scene. This knowledge thus deserves, by definition, the use of the term 
‘intelligence’. For instance, when CSEs recognise a typical pattern at a scene, knowledge 
gained from previous interventions on similar cases orient the search for points of contacts in 
the new situation. 
The framework takes also into account pragmatic constraints (time, complexity, available 
means – human and technological), and the consequent priorisation of interventions according 
to objectives. These objectives, more often than not, refer to the outcome traditionally 
expected from a forensic process: a collected information structured to support the decision 
making process of a law court. This is obviously a far too restrictive view when considering 
intelligence-led styles of policing. Objectives extend then to security purposes (e.g. reducing 
crime, diminishing harm, reassuring victims, managing risks) [3]. The developed framework 
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intends thus also to structure the debate around how to combine and optimise the variety of 
contributions of forensic science. In turn, it clarifies the role and function of CSEs [13].  
The model still needs some refinement and should be challenged further. In this paper we 
focus on the intelligence level, and question how it influences, effectively (or not), CSEs in 
their daily practice.  
For this purpose, we begin by extracting from the literature different views on the role and 
nature of crime scene investigation. It shows the many dimensions and tensions pervading the 
activity. They derive from the observation that crime scene investigation serves at the same 
time different paradigms of security and justice. They are under-studied. We will show that 
the relationship between crime scene investigation and intelligence appears throughout this 
literature, but is poorly analysed. In order to test if an intelligence level deserves the key 
position proposed by Ribaux et al. [12] in their model, this study tests its actual influence in 
the particular context of a relatively small area in Switzerland. Specific hypothesis addressed 
by this research will be stated. They are tested through two questionnaires sent to CSEs and 
managers of intelligence units. How the questionnaires were devised is the topic of the next 
section. Finally, results are presented and interpreted in order to better understand the nature 
and role of crime scene investigation in intelligence-led policing, and the validity of the three 
levels model.  
2. Crime scene investigation and the role of CSEs 
Forensic science largely ignores crime scene investigation [18]. The dominant conception of 
the discipline is too often restricted to the operations of a laboratory (also called forensic 
science provider) where scientists experts extract characteristics from the material collected. 
There observations are interpreted systematically in the perspective of a court trial. This 
‘structural’ view on forensic science fragment the whole treatment of forensic case data, from 
its collection at the scene, to its use in the many processes that may support decisions [19, 20]. 
Indeed, the origin of the information collected seems to belong to a separate, largely 
unconnected, activity.    
When taken into consideration, the contribution of forensic science to crime scene 
investigation focuses on the expectation of the Justice System in terms of the production of 
evidence dedicated to a court. Validity and limit of technologies, the chain of custody, or 
contaminations and pollutions constitute main concerns [21]. Accreditation of procedures, 
validation of techniques, and certification of CSEs are seen as key objectives to reach in order 
to increase confidence of the Justice System in the information it uses for its decisions [22]. 
The court is the target that must guide all operations, from the first intervention at the scene, 
even if only a tiny part of the information collected will eventually influence court’s decisions 
[23].  
Research has shown that a great proportion of forensic scientists, and CSEs themselves, tend 
to perceive the role of CSEs exclusively along their support to the justice system, as evidence 
collectors [20]. This emphasis on the mechanical and controlled parts of the process may 
mask other roles and qualities only occasionnaly attributed to the CSEs [21]. 
CSEs are also recognised to assist systematically investigators in reconstructing the crime and 
in identifying frames of suspects. They seem to take a more integrated, yet implicit, role of 
advisor associated to forensic scientists of the laboratory, and to crime investigators [20, 24]. 
Indeed, researchers observe, by studying practices, confirmation of the existence of more 
extended roles for CSEs within police organisations [21, 25].These roles call for a globally 
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inductive logic, which is not grasped by the mechanisation preconized by standard operating 
procedures [25-27]. 
Our study contributes to the search for a better balance between expressed and implicit 
processes. We postulate that intelligence influences CSEs. On the other way round, forensic 
case data collected at the scene also feed intelligence processes. This would explicit a role for 
CSEs not only as a provider to the Justice System or as an investigator but, more broadly, as a 
key player of proactive and intelligence-led policing [28].   
The relationship between intelligence and crime scene investigation is often detected by 
studying various practices [4, 7, 29, 30], rather than envisaged through a formalised 
framework. The three levels framework mentioned above intend to fill this gap. However, it 
still needs to be refined [12, 13, 31]. Of importance is that it integrates an intelligence level to 
attest that intelligence plays a key role in crime scene investigation. This study aims at 
consolidating this level by questioning active CSEs in a small area of Switzerland about its 
reality and its form.   
3. Context of the study 
Situated at the heart of Europe (without belonging to the European Union itself), Switzerland 
is a federal state divided into 4 linguistic regions and hosting 8 millions inhabitants. The 
Swiss Confederation is composed of 26 cantons. Each runs its own autonomous police. This 
study focuses on the police of the French part of the country, which includes the cantons of 
Vaud, Genève, Valais, Fribourg, Neuchâtel and Jura
1
. A little less than 2 millions of people 
are living in this region.  
The mean ratio of 2 policemen per 1000 residents has been rather stable for the last decade
2
. 
Each police is equipped with a forensic science unit (FSU). Employees of these units are both 
civilians coming from the School of Criminal Justice of the University of Lausanne and 
policemen educated and trained by the police system itslef. A significant part of academics 
has followed the whole, or only part, of the police education and training program. The 
professional structure and organisation vary however broadly from one canton to another.  
Crime intelligence on high volume and repetitive crimes is produced at a local and a regional 
level. Each canton is operating an intelligence unit (IU). IUs are then networked to form the 
structure called CICOP
3
 [32, 33]. The CICOP itself is further networked with other 
components of the security system (e.g. border guards, police and international customs 
cooperation centres). 
Locally, an IU gathers data from other city police covering their territories, as well as from 
regular interactions with various departments and by accessing a series of available database. 
Crime intelligence is exchanged, compared and synthesised at the regional level, and 
disseminated both for strategic and operational purposes through a variety of intelligence 
products, at the different levels, and according to different functions. Forensic case data plays 
a key role in feeding the sustained process operated by IUs and the CICOP. Integrated into a 
shared database, they help detect and monitor a significant number of crime series and 
improve knowledge on typical and pervasive forms of criminality [34].  
                                                 
1
 Swiss Federal Statistical Office– Effectif de population à la fin du 3e trimestre 2014: résultats provisoires. 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/01/new/nip_detail.html?gnpID=2014-083 (last access, 
14th Feb. 2015). 
2
 European statistics, Eurostat, 2012, http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ (last access, 14th Feb. 2015). 
3
 French acronym for Concept Intercantonal de Coordination Operationnelle et Préventive. 
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The main recipients of crime intelligence products are patrols and investigative units [33]. 
What about forensic science units?  Do intelligence products reach them? To which extend 
intelligence is perceived and practically used within these units? Is this information tailored 
for CSEs concerns?  
We limit our approach to two specific, but important intelligence products: knowledge about 
current crime series (similar crimes perpetrated by the same offender or group of offenders) 
[35], as well as crimes resulting from typical opportunities, also called phenomenon [36]. 
These criminal phenomena may or may not be perpetrated by the same offenders or group of 
offenders. Throughout the text, intelligence is used as actionable knowledge related to these 
definitions. 
Of importance is to mention that crime intelligence is not restricted to the information 
analysed and disseminated by Intelligence Units, but extends to informal exchanges between 
CSEs themselves, as well as with crime investigators or other entities (e.g. prevention units, 
patrols units).  
4. Specific questions addressed  
In accordance with Roux et al. [22], we will use the term ‘trace’ to denote all (physical) 
remnants of a crime activity. This is to avoid the term ‘evidence’, which too early in the 
process gives the flavour of a court of law [37, 38].  
We consider that crime scene investigation can be expressed along three processes requiring 
many decisions of different nature to be made [4, 6, 24]: 
 The intervention, from the realisation that a crime occurred to the arrival at the scene (if 
the scene should be attended by crime scene examiners);  
 Crime scene investigation itself, leading to the detection, observation and collection of 
material;  
 The exploitation of the material collected. 
According to this definition, four hypothesis are addressed in this study: 
H1 Intelligence products disseminated by the CICOP and local IUs are effectively made 
available to CSEs.  
H2 CSEs consider these intelligence products.  
H3 CSEs use available intelligence to guide crime scene investigation  
H4 Intelligence has an influence on decision-making processes at the three stages of 
crime scene investigation. It influences:  
1. managerial doctrines of intervention 
2. the nature and type of traces collected 
3. the nature and type of traces exploited 
5. Methodology 
Two electronic and self-administrated questionnaires have been designed in order to test these 
hypotheses.  
The first questionaire was sent to all employees (both civilian and policemen – N= 117) 
operating in FSUs over the region under consideration. 73 questionaires were returned and 
have been analysed, representing a 62,4% participation rate  (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Distribution of CSEs by cantonal FSUs and participation rates  
Cantons 
Total number of CSEs by 
FSUs 
Number of CSEs who 
participated  
Participation Rates 
Vaud 19 12 
10 
63,2% 
Valais 10 100% 
Fribourg 16 13 81,2% 
Neuchatel 15 11 73,3% 
Geneva 48 10 20,8% 
Jura 9 4 44,4% 
Blind canton
4
 - 13 - 
Total 117 73 62,4% 
 
This questionnaire was structured around three sections in order to collect information 
regarding: (1) the dissemination of intelligence products
5
 by IUs and how they reach CSEs 
(e.g. modes and frequency of dissemination, how CSEs are made aware of these products, 
what is the perception of CSEs about them)
6
; (2) the crime scene investigation process and its 
three phases (i.e. use of available intelligence compared to other factors identified in the 
literature, intelligence influence on practices) and (3) the biographical data of respondents 
such as gender, age, training and education, professional experience, and operating unit. 
These data have been used as control variables during our analysis. 
Table 2 provides an example of the questions used by section
7
.  
Table 2: Sample of questions asked to CSEs by section 
Sections Questions  
(1) Dissemination of 
intelligence products 
to CSEs by IUs 
Do you receive written documents containing information related to 
crime series and/or criminal phenomena on a regular basis? 
Proposed response: Yes/No/Do not want to answer 
If yes: 
                                                 
4
 7 questionnaires that were too incomplete have not been used (less than 3 answers by questionnaire) and 13 
CSEs dit not mention their working canton. However, to take into account their responses during our analysis 
those have been considered as being part of the “blind canton”. 
5
 In the questionnaires, the term « informations » has been used in place of « intelligence ». This choice results 
from a supposed discrepency in its understanding by CSEs, as well as its negative conotation. Particularly in 
Switzerland, where the police has been severly blamed during the 90s for having violated civil liberties in 
recording huge amount of information about the population.  
6
 A preliminary question has been integrated into the questionnaire in order to ensure that CSEs where aware 
about the difference meant between a series of crime, and a typical crime phenomenon. 
7
 For the purpose of this article the questions have been translated from French to English. 
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1. In what frequency? 
Proposed responses: Everyday/Twice a week/… /Less than once a 
month/Do not want to answer 
2. How often do you read these documents? 
Proposed responses: Always/Often/Rarely/Never/Do not want to 
answer 
Similar questions were asked for obtaining information on how crime 
intelligence is dessiminated through specific written documents, 
meetings (regular/exceptional), intranet and database access, as well 
as informal communications channels between CSEs and IUs officers. 
(2) The crime scene 
investigation 
process and its three 
phases 
 
Example with the 
first step: Crime 
scene attendance 
Use of intelligence: 
If not mandatory
8
, when called to intervene on a crime scene resulting 
from an attempt or a high volume crime, your decision to intervene is 
based on: 
Proposed responses:  Gravity of the offence/Intelligence produced 
from previous cases/Perceived probability of 
finding traces/Distance to the crime scene/Size 
and nature of the scene to investigate 
(urban/rural)/Time of day 
(day/night)/Remaining time before the end of 
the shift/Time of week/The weather (rain, 
snow, etc)/Current workload. 
The respondents were invited to choose between: 
Always/Often/Rarely/Never  
for each of these propositions.  
Influence of intelligence: 
If not mandatory, you usually attend crime scenes resulting from: 
Proposed responses:  Vehicle break-ins/Attempted house 
burglaries/House burglaries/Motor vehicle 
thefts.   
The respondents were asked to choose between: 
Always/Often/Rarely/Never  
for each of these propositions. 
To estimate the influence of intelligence on CSEs practices, responses 
to this type of questions were compared according to the frequency 
with which CSEs consider available intelligence in general. 
 
The questionnaire was composed of 36 questions. Except for four of them, all questions were 
structured following a closed multiple response format (e.g. Always/Often/Rarely/Never). In 
                                                 
8
 Previous to this question, respondents were asked to specify if the attendance of the crime scenes of interest in 
this study was mandatory. This disctinction was necessary to compare CSE’s practices. 
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the first section of the questionnaire, the decision was made to use mostly filter questions and, 
when needed, detailed questions. In its second section, we used matrix questions, which allow 
the respondents to give their opinion on different proposals, according to different types of 
assessment. Matrix questions were preferred as they can address various questions 
simultaneously, which reduces at the same time the size of the questionnaire [39]. 
In order to limit influences on respondents, no direct question related to the use and influence 
of intelligence has been formulated
9
. Chi-2 correlation tests have been used to compare CSEs 
typical attitudes and practices according to the frequency with which they consider available 
intelligence produced by Intelligence Units (always/often versus rarely/never)
10
. 
The second questionnaire composed of 20 questions was sent to managers of Intelligence 
Units in the 6 cantons (N=10). Their responses have been compared to those provided by 
CSEs regarding the dissemination of intelligence products. This questionnaire was very 
similar to the first section of the other one. It covered modes and frequencies of intelligence 
dissemination, using close-ended questions as well. 9 questionnaires over 10 have been 
analysed (participation rate of 90%).  
A pre-test has been previously organised. It has been carried out in another police agency 
(canton of Bern) in order not to reduce the population studied. This operation has resulted in 
an adjustment of the questionnaires. Some specific questions taking into account specificities 
of French speaking police have also completed the initial formulation based on the scientific 
literature.  
6. Results  
6.1. Intelligence products are actually made available by IUs to CSEs 
The following results came from responses obtained from managers of IUs (n=9) and from 
CSEs (n=73). 
Some differences (inter IUs and intra FSU) are observed in terms of modes
11
 and frequency of 
diffusions. Intelligence products from IUs and CICOP are disseminated on a regular basis to 
CSEs, whatever the police agency. They are mostly disseminated through databases or an 
intranet (74%). In all cantons, respondents attest that informal communications channels 
between IUs officers and CSEs are initiated from both sides (78,1%). A significant proportion 
of CSEs are receiving specific
12
 and/or systematic written documents (respectively 61,6% and 
60,3%). They also affirm being invited at regular and/or exceptional meetings where 
intelligence is disseminated (respectively 49,3% et 39,7%).  
The density of the population covered by the police agency, the number of reported crimes in 
the canton, the physical/organisational proximity between units (IUs and FSUs), and the 
number of CSEs operating within FSUs seem to have no influence on the intelligence 
dissemination (mode and frequency). The formal or informal mode of transmission does not 
influence this result.   
                                                 
9
 For example, direct questions like « Do you use intelligence available (…)? », or « does intelligence influence 
your decisions (…)? » have not been asked. 
10
 The number of respondents being relatively low (73 CSEs), multivariate analysis were not relevant.  
11
 Both questionnaires distinguish carefully formal (reports, meetings) and informal (informal meetings, punctual 
demands) dissemination, as well as the action of making information available (database, intranet). 
12
 In order to refine results, a distinction has been integrated between systematic and specific documents, as well 
as between regular and exceptional meetings.  
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6.2 CSEs consider intelligence products 
Results presented in the following sections are based on the responses obtained from CSEs 
(n= 73).  
A significant majority of CSEs considers the available intelligence even if some of them seem 
more concerned than others. Almost 54% of CSEs pretend to always/often consider 
intelligence products formally or informally disseminated. This subpopulation is principally 
constituted by males (60,5% males vs. 43,7% females)
13
, aged 40 to 55 (66,7% vs. 51,2% in 
those aged 24 to 39) with an academic background acquired principally from the forensic 
school of University of Lausanne (63,6% vs. 50% in those with a police background), and 15 
years or more experience in crime scene investigation within a FSU (66,7% vs. 54,5% in 
those with less than 15 years of practice).  
Only one respondent stated never consider intelligence produced within his/her organisation, 
without specifying the reasons why.  
84,9% of respondents considered intelligence related to crime series and typical crime 
phenomena as useful. The three main reasons reported are: (1) intelligence improves their 
knowledge on crime series and typical crimes (29%), (2) intelligence allows them to orient 
their approach at the crime scene (25,8%), and (3) intelligence allows them to chose which 
scene is worth to be investigated and to orient their approach at the scene (21%).     
However, only 10% of CSEs indicate the use of intelligence as a way to simplify their work 
and crime investigation. 
46% of CSEs responded rarely or never considering intelligence produced by IUs or the 
CICOP (with the exception of specific documents). This result does not necessarly mean that 
these CSEs are not interested in intelligence. It may be explained by a lack of time resulting 
from high pressures and workload and/or a difficult access to intelligence products poorly 
“publicized”. They may also consider that these products are not tailored for their specific 
needs, their colleagues CSEs already provide sufficient intelligence informally or that they are 
able, through lessons learned from their own experience, to infer themselves what is the 
adequate attitude at the scene.  
6.3 CSEs use frequently intelligence to guide crime scene investigation  
6.3.1 Intelligence and crime scene attendance  
When called to intervene on a crime scene resulting from an attempt or a high volume crime 
such as a burglary, a car theft or a car break-in, CSEs can have the latitude to choose to attend 
the scene or not (depending on the police management type). When it is the case, more than 
70% of CSEs pretend to always or often consider intelligence produced from previous cases.  
According to 60% of them, intelligence can help them identify if the new case is part of a 
known crime series and/or a known crime phenomenon. In that case, they consider the case as 
more ‘important’. Their interest on the case also increases since they can evaluate, from 
previous experience, their chance of finding material and traces. This observation confirms 
recurring results from the literature, where ‘importance’14 and ‘chance to find relevant 
                                                 
13
 This observation is not surprising since the proportion of female is relatively low within FSUs and within our 
respondents. 
14
 The importance of a case increase when related to a crime series or a typical crime phenomenon, which 
themselves are considering to cause significant harm.  
  
 
10 / 20 
 
material at the scene’ are the two main criteria determining the relevancy of crime scene 
attendance [4, 6, 12, 30, 40].  
This knowledge of crime series and phenomena seems however not only coming from 
structured intelligence products disseminated by IUs. Among CSEs who reported often to 
always base their decisions on this criterion, 46% recognise rarely or never consider 
intelligence disseminated by IUs (against 97% who reported always/often taking it into 
consideration).  It is thus probable that intelligence comes also from other sources than IUs. 
Forensic intelligence provided, informally or formally, at the level of their unit probably 
explains an important part of this discrepancy. Crime investigators, patrols officers or direct 
contact with other entities (intern/extern to their police) concerned by those crimes offer also 
other possible channels for generating crime intelligence. 
Interestingly, CSEs specify that they never or rarely base their decision to attend - or not - a 
scene on the nature or extend of the space to investigate, on the period of the week (working 
days or week-ends), on the time remaining before the end of a shift, or on the weather. 
However, more than 20% of CSEs often consider workload and time of day (day or night) 
when making their decisions.   
6.3.2 Intelligence and crime scene processing  
Two third of CSEs recognise using their own experience and knowledge as well as 
intelligence to guide them during crime scene processing, when they suspect the case to be 
part of a crime series/phenomenon. However, more than 20% reported adopting the same 
approach whatever the case type (e.g. high volume crime, serious crime). 
When comparing CSEs that always or often consider intelligence to those who rarely or never 
consider it, we observe a noticeable difference. More than 80% of CSEs who reported always 
or often consider intelligence produced by IUs reported using intelligence in this phase. 
Among those who rarely or never consider intelligence produced by IUs, 46,2% of CSEs still 
reported using intelligence to guide them during crime scene processing. 
Once again, results tend to show that CSEs rely not only on intelligence produced by IUs but 
also on intelligence disseminated through other channels such as exchanges with immediate 
colleagues and other entities. Use of available intelligence as well as use of experience and 
personal knowledge could be explain by the fact that they can give specific informations 
regading the nature, the quantity, the quality and the location of traces potentially present on 
the crime scene. 
6.3.3 Intelligence and trace selection for exploitation  
More than 68% of CSEs reported often to always base the selection of traces to be exploited 
on intelligence available. Knowledge of previous cases allows targeting the most promising 
kinds of forensic case data in the context of a series or a typical crime phenomenon. It may 
constitute the main motivation for using crime intelligence [12]. 
An example of the form such a mechanism can take, is provided by Baylon [41]. When CSEs 
recognise a new case of house burglary as belonging to a typical phenomenon, they generally 
collect latent biological material at a particular commonly identified point of contact (on the 
window of the premises). It is assumed that the specific modus operandi used by perpetrators 
in this kind of situations creates exchange of biological material at this specific point. 
Swabbing at this point is part of a routine approach when processing such scenes. However, 
during the investigation of a crime scene belonging to this phenomenon, the specimens 
collected sent to the laboratory did not provide a DNA profile. The situation was then re-
assessed by the forensic science unit. The focus turned towards other kinds of traces that were 
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regularly noticed on similar cases (e.g. shoemarks). The forensic science unit itself (and not 
IUs) provided forensic intelligence that resulted in a change in the way scenes were 
processed. An assessment of the crime environment led to revise practices and guide the 
selection of traces to focus on, specifically according to these types of cases.  
Intelligence is however relegated to the fourth position among the criteria considered as 
influential on trace selection. It comes after the perceived quality of traces (95%), personal 
experience and knowledge (91,7%) and the nature of the traces (71,7%). Fewer respondents 
seem to rely on technical resources available (66,7%), exploitation costs (36,7%), available 
time (33,3%) and necessary time to analyse the material (10%). 
CSEs who said taking often to always note of intelligence provided by IUs are however much 
more numerous to base their selection on all types of intelligence (82,9% vs. 48%).  
Once again, intelligence is recognised not being provided exclusively by IUs. There is 
however a strong correlation between interests in intelligence in general to support decisions 
in all stages of crime scene investigation, and interest in intelligence provided by IUs.  
6.4 A likely influence of intelligence on crime scene investigation process 
6.4.1 Doctrine of intervention  
When the intervention is not defined as mandatory by an internal procedure, most CSEs do 
not attend cases of vehicles break-in (75%), attempted house burglaries (73,5%) and motor 
vehicles theft (62%). The only exception concerns house burglaries: 68,9% of CSEs often 
choose to attend such scenes, even when there is no pressure from their hierarchy the 
management.  
These results confirm observations made by Adderley et al. [42], Baylon [41] and Jansson 
[43] that high volume crimes rarely constitute a priority in terms of crime scene attendance.   
It appears from the data that CSEs who reported taking into consideration often to always 
intelligence provided by IUs intervene more often on house burglaries cases (86,7% vs. 
35,7%). A smaller influence is also observed for cars break-in (28,9% vs. 13,3%). However 
no difference is noticeable between CSEs who consider intelligence and the ones who do not 
regarding intervention on attempted burglaries (26,3% vs. 26,7%) or vehicles theft (33,3% vs. 
34,6%). 
In summary, intelligence does not have a great influence on general doctrine of intervention, 
even when CSEs have certain latitude to make their own decisions. Only house burglaries 
and, to a lesser extent, car break-ins are exceptions. Some case studies have also shown that 
this influence may appear when considering singular cases. For instance, when a car theft has 
been connected through the analysis of data with a robbery, if the car is recovered, it is 
obviously generally investigated by CSEs (it becomes part of the robbery).  
6.4.2 Likely influence of intelligence on the nature and quality of traces detected  
CSEs focus their search differently depending on the type and quality of trace [27].    
A trace can come from a person or be caused by an object. These traces may be of different 
qualities (e.g. very fragmentary or supposed to contain a lot of information from its source).  
Of course, high quality traces coming from persons have intuitively the favour of CSEs. As 
they match criteria for using databases, they promise the possibility of a direct identification 
of the perpetrator, and they allow a more comfortable situation for forensic experts, if the 
trace has to be evaluated for court purpose.    
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6.4.2.1 The nature of traces searched for and collected 
CSEs search for and collect preferably traces coming from persons, rather than traces coming 
from objects. All CSEs reported searching always or often material likely to provide a DNA 
profile or fingermarks. Among them, almost 94% indicated searching always or often also 
other kind of traces coming from a person, such as earmarks or footmarks. Marks coming 
from an object such as tool marks or fibers are less frequently searched for. More than two 
third of CSEs reported searching rarely or even never such marks, at the exception of 




These results are in line with numerous researches available on this topic [42, 44-47].  
Of importance is to notice that CSEs who indicate taking into consideration regularly 
intelligence produced by IUs seem to show not only more interest on traces coming from 
persons, but also on traces coming from objects (Tables 2 and 3). Among them, almost 60% 
reported often to always search for object traces, other than shoemarks. Among CSEs who 
rarely or never take into consideration intelligence, only 50% rarely search for material 
coming from objects. 
Table 3: Traces coming from persons - Traces searched by CSEs, and frequency with which they take 




Proportion of CSEs searching for traces coming from persons  













Always 94,4% (34) 90% (27) 88,9% (32) 86,7% (26) 69,4% (25) 56,7% (17) 
Frequently 5,6% (2) 10% (3) 11,1% (4) 13,3% (4) 27,8% (10) 33,3% (10) 
Rarely - - - - 2,8% (1) 10% (3) 
Never - - - - - - 
                                   χ2 = .46, df=1, p= .497                  χ2 = .076, df=1, p= .783                  χ2 = 1.99, df=1, p= .369 
 
Table 4: Traces coming from objects - Traces searched by CSEs and frequency with which they take 




Proportion of CSEs searching for traces coming from objects 
Shoemarks Other traces (objects) 
 Often to always Rarely to never Often to always Rarely to never 
Always 100% (36) 100% (30) 19,4% (7) 0% (0) 
Often - - 38,9% (14) 0% (0) 
Rarely - - 38,9% (14) 50% (15) 
Never - - 2,8% (1) 50% (15) 
          χ2 = 33, df=1, p= .000 
                                                 
15
 Girod et al. (2008) explained a specific interest for shoemarks in the region under consideration through the 
influence of researches carried out in this field at the School of criminal justice of the University of Lausanne.  
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Most CSEs who reported often to always considering intelligence specified being interested in 
object traces because they may: 




 Have recognised similarities with traces collected from other cases (e.g. shoe sole 
pattern or singularities) (61,9 %); 
 Bring new light on a crime series or a crime phenomenon (57,1%); 
 Help confirm that the case belongs to a crime series or a specific phenomenon 
(52,4%). 
These results are in line with the elementary proposition [22, 28, 45, 48], which state that 
forensic case data do not only serve a court to form its decisions, but feed many other 
processes related to crime investigation or more broadly to knowledge about crime that may 
support other security purposes.  
 
6.4.2.2 The quality of traces searched for and collected 
CSEs mostly focus their search and collection on high quality traces, but a significant part of 
them (47%) also reported searching often to always for fragmentary traces. There seem to be 
an acceptable limit in terms of quality, as all respondents recognised only rarely to never 
search for very fragmentary (poor quality) traces
17
. These results support modestly the 
observations made for instance by [6, 49], who reported that the search for fragmentary traces 
is rare.  
However, CSEs who often to always consider intelligence tend to more often search for 
fragmentary traces, in comparison with CSEs who do not show interest (80% vs. 3,4 %). The 
same CSEs interested in intelligence are more prone to search for very fragmentary traces 
(respectively 77,1% vs. 24,1%). 
CSEs explained their interest for fragmentary traces when they:  
 Have already been observed on previous cases (e.g. patterns, singularities) (64,7%); 
 Tend to link the new case with previous ones (58,8%); 
 Support the comprehension of the development of a series or bring knowledge on the 
understanding of a crime phenomenon (50%); 
 Support the understanding of the modus operandi (44,1%); 
 May support an identification process, despite their poor quality (41,2%). 
Beyond strongly supporting H4, these results also re-confirm the hypothesis formulated by 
[18, 46], who stated that CSEs interested in intelligence would be more prone to search for 
and extract information that may go beyond the direct identification of a person, in order to 
bring new light on a crime problem. Even if this information is of poor quality.  
                                                 
16
 This pourcentage corresponds to the proportion of CSEs who estimate this proposition as the most important 
compared to the other propositions. The interpretation is the same for the following pourcentages. 
17
 The question distinguish three levels of quality : good quality (perceived as sufficient to identify the source) ; 
poor quality (e.g. percieved fragmentary) and very poor quality (e.g. perceived very fragmentary). 
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6.4.3 The exploitation of traces collected  
During this phase, a triage takes place in order to select the collected traces that are evaluated 
as worth to be examined or immediately confronted to databases. Otherwise traces are 
preserved for a possible future use.    
This process and the related decisions are obviously linked to the previous phase of crime 
scene investigation (trace selections at the scene). This is why results are presented within a 
similar structure, in regard with the nature and quality of traces exploited.   
6.4.3.1 The nature of traces exploited 
Not surprisingly, all CSEs affirmed using often to always traces coming from persons (in fact 
mostly DNA profile and fingermarks), while the use of object traces remains less frequent. 
The only exception concerns once again shoemarks, as a probable effect of a specific forensic 
culture among CSEs. 
Moreover, there is no much difference between CSEs who often to always consider 
intelligence and CSEs who do not. Only exception, CSEs who consider intelligence more 
often tend to exploit more frequently traces coming from objects (Tables 4 and 5). 
Table 5: Traces coming from persons - Traces exploited by CSEs and frequency with which they take 
into consideration intelligence disseminated by IUs (n=60) 
CSEs consider 
intelligence 
Proportion of CSEs exploiting traces coming from persons  
DNA  Fingermarks    Other traces (person) 












Always 45,7% (16) 32% (8) 68,6% (24) 72% (18) 45,7% (16) 48% (12) 
Often 54,3% (19) 68% (17) 31,4% (11) 28% (7) 42,9% (15) 40% (10) 
Rarely - - - - 11,4% (4) 12% (3) 
Never - - - - - - 
            χ2 = 1.14, df=1, p= .285                     χ2 = .08, df=1, p= .775                χ2 = .05, df=2, p= .976 
Table 6: Traces coming from objects - Traces exploited by CSEs and frequency with which they take 




Proportion of CSEs exploiting traces coming from objects  
Shoemarks Other traces (objects) 
 Often to always Rarely to never Often to always Rarely to never 
Always 77,1% (27) 72% (18) 5,7% (2) 0% (0) 
Often 22,9% (8) 28% (7) 54,3% (19) 4% (1) 
Rarely - - 40% (14) 48% (12) 
Never - - 0% (0) 48% (12) 
    χ2 = .21, df=1, p= .650                     χ2 = 29, df=3, p= .000 
 
These results point in the same direction as those observed in 6.4.2.1. The motivation of 
bringing new light on crime problems, beyond the direct identification process in the 
perspective of the apprehension of a suspect and his presentation to a Court, seems to have an 
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effect on the variety of information exploited by CSEs [18, 42, 45-47].  
6.4.3.2 The traces relevancy  
CSEs had to estimate to which frequency the traces they have collected have proved to be 
relevant after they were analysed and interpreted.   
More than two third of CSEs reported exploiting often to always relevant traces. This may 
reflect social desirability rather than reality [50]. It is however particularly remarkable that 
CSEs, who take into consideration intelligence, reported exploiting much more frequently 
relevant traces than CSEs who broadly ignore available intelligence (respectively 91,4% 
against 36%). 
These results seem to show that CSEs mostly agree with a hypothesis formulated by [12]. It 
states that intelligence can support the search for relevant traces (i.e. traces linked with the 
case and bringing a significant piece of information).  
6.4.3.3 The quality of exploited traces 
Only a minority of CSEs reported exploiting fragmentary traces (always or often), whatever 
the objectives: better understanding the event and the modus operandi (43,4%), reducing the 
frame of suspects (40%), linking cases (36,6%), or improving knowledge about a series or 
criminal mechanisms (35%). 
However, once again those who more often consider intelligence produced by IUs are more 
prone to use fragmentary traces, than those who rarely/never consider it  (Table 6). 
Table 7: Fragmentary traces exploited by CSEs and frequency with which they take into consideration 




Proportion of CSEs exploiting fragmentary traces  





















































                  χ2 = 27, df=1, p= .000 χ2 = 7, df=1, p= .008          χ2 = 8, df=1, p= .005          χ2 = 7, df=1, p= .009  
 
These results support our hypotheses H4 since crime intelligence seems to have an influence 
on CSE’s practices.  CSEs who show an interest in intelligence by taking often note of it tend 
to have a inclination to exploit more frequently traces coming from objects, as well as 
relevant and fragmentary traces in order to bring information to various intelligence 
processes, compared to those who are less engaged in intelligence.  
6. Discussion / Conclusion 
This study contributes to the increasing body of literature focusing on crime scene 
investigation and its relation to crime and forensic intelligence. It reports attitudes and 
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implicit practices, which are otherwise not grasped by the standard operating procedures 
proliferating in this field.  
This is an exploratory study, because the number of respondents remains small. In addition, it 
covers a specific region where the influence of the University on forensic and intelligence 
practices may distort perceptions. This is due to the fact that forensic science and intelligence 
units are staffed by alumni from the School of Criminal Justice, and its forensic branch at 
University of Lausanne. The generalization of the results should thus be taken with caution. 
Moreover, this study was not designed to assess the impact of intelligence on the 
improvement of the ‘efficiency’ of crime scene investigators, whatever this term would mean. 
This aspect was thus not measured. The interest of CSEs in crime and forensic intelligence 
and the specific influence of intelligence in guiding the process have been however 
documented and clarified. 
With reference to our hypotheses, the results show the following: 
1. Most CSEs consider crime intelligence when they have to decide to attend a crime scene or 
not. In particular, they consider such a knowledge as important since it can help them identify 
if a case is part of a known crime series and/or of a known crime phenomenon and shed light 
on typical forms of crimes. This kind of approach is generally inopposed to the way 
organisations tend to manage high volume crimes [41-43]. They prefer to classify events 
according to their gravity (serious, crime against persons, high volume), or consider criteria 
such as the value of stolen goods when dealing with burglary for example. By using such 
criteria, organisations deviate from basic principles of intelligence-led policing, where 
burglaries should be seen as a serial crime, highly concentrated, and in particular caused by 
prolific offenders. An attempted burglary crime scene with relevant information available 
may be much more important to target prolific offenders than a case with high value stolen 
goods. In other words, organisations remain largely focused on single and separated events, 
scored as more or less important with regards to the law.  
2. Most CSEs use available crime intelligence as well as their own knowledge and experience 
to target their search during crime scene processing. They also choose what is worth to be 
collected, not only for court purpose, but also much more broadly, in regard with the whole 
crime environment.  
3. Most CSEs recognise the value of intelligence in a triage process consisting of selecting the 
collected traces worth to be exploited. This is of high importance in regards with backlogs and 
costs that impose organisations to adopt a rational selection process [24, 41]. 
4. Results eventually show some reciprocity between FSUs and IUs. IUs provide intelligence 
that influence crime scene investigation. Conversely, information provided by traces collected 
at the scene feed intelligence process. This concern appears clearly with the collection of 
traces of lower quality than generally required (or perceived to be required) by the justice 
system. This information is entirely dedicated to a better understanding of modus operandi, 
crime systems, or more broadly, crime environment. 
Our approch is thus, at this stage, descriptive, rather than a prescription of how CSEs should 
operate. Indeed, the use of crime intelligence in crime scene investigation immediately 
resonates with cognitive biases [51-54]. Risks to create undesirable effects by disseminating 
crime intelligence exist. Crime scene investigators would generally tend to focus on what they 
or their organisation know and prioritise. This could lead to forget the singular nature of crime 
events, and hamper the discovery of new crime mechanisms. For this reason, some would 
argue that crime intelligence must be masked to crime scene investigators.  
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We do not agree with this position. First, regardless of the approach, crime scene investigation 
is not a passive process. It necessitates the development of conjectures about what occurred, 
and the use of knowledge of different types. Without knowledge of different kinds and 
hypotheses, it would be difficult to explain how traces are detected and collected. Removing 
crime intelligence from crime scene investigation would obviously create a net lack of 
information on how to make decision for efficiently addressing high volume crimes. Second, 
crime and forensic intelligence is generally much more neutral than common interpretation of 
the term ‘intelligence’ may suggest (e.g. pointing systematically towards persons, surveillance 
or National security). Disseminating information such that ‘a specific sole pattern has been 
recurrently observed on recent burglary cases’ is of a very different nature. This is why we 
have used throughout the texte the term ‘crime intelligence’ or ‘forensic intelligence’, rather 
than solely ‘intelligence’.  
Biases induced by a priori knowledge, as well as by emotions (probably very impactive for 
CSEs) obviously have to be mitigated by complementary mechanisms. They should anyhow 
not be addressed by removing from the methodology information guiding efficiently to the 
detection of relevant traces.  
Results obtained tend to show that CSEs interested in crime intelligence perceive their role in 
accordance with broader intelligence-led policing frameworks, rather than exclusively from a 
legalist point of view. The tensions however pervade, and this extended role remains most of 
the time more implicit than explicit within police organisations.   
This hypothesis is of great importance in regards with evolutions of forensic science. An 
increasing pressure tends to force the accreditation of crime scene investigation units and 
procedures. This necessarily favours a mechanical and controlled view of procedures at the 
scene, in order to bring information in the way required by the justice systems and for court 
purposes. This legalist approach tends to dismiss any kind of intelligence from crime scene 
investigations in order to avoid cognitive biais (contextual effects). However, the lack of 
interest by the forensic science community for this rationality may lead to many 
misunderstandings and paradoxes. This places CSEs in a very uncomfortable position, in-
between two conceptions, poorly expressed and difficult to articulate. The prescriptive nature, 
deprived from contextual information, preconized by the legalist approach, contrasts with 
abilities to associate ideas, develop conjectures and interpret information within a context 
provided by intelligence and investigative frameworks. If training and education focus 
exclusively on mechanical, formalised, required, and controlled dimensions of the processes, 
this will necessarily reduce the capacity of organisations to improve their knowledge of the 
crime environment. Traces will not feed adequately intelligence processes, while they 
constitute the more objective and solid information on crimes. The rationality of organisations 
for devising efficient policing would be greatly impacted.   
This debate will necessarily continue, as the legalist approach meets many challenges and 
show to be largely in crisis within laboratories [22]. From this side, how intelligence-led 
policing is really implemented is still controversial [3]. Further studies are necessary, for 
instance to investigate whether CSEs – who are taking into consideration and are using 
intelligence – actually collect different types of traces, or whether they provide a broader 
spectrum of information to their organisation. The nature of intelligence used should also be a 
focus of interest: do IUs tailor adequately information dedicated to CSEs? Is forensic 
intelligence adequately implemented? What is the part of tacit vs. structured knowledge 
influencing crime scene investigation? Do academics employed, by the police, as CSEs, are 
more or less prone to the use of intelligence?  
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These are questions our study does not pretend to answer. A qualitative approach combining 
one-to-one interviews and/or focus group, together with field observations, could be consider 
to conduct further studies on crime intelligence and crime scene investigation. They would 
clarify and emphasis on the diverse roles CSEs actually play, but that organisations usually 
fail to attribute them.   
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We cannot guarantee that the totality of the respondents answering ‘academic 
background’ have this specific academic background. We can attest however this is a 
very large majority. This aspect may be part of the explanation to the obtained results. It 
has been discussed in the conclusion.  
 
Concerning reference style, authors should use the FSI Guide for Authors. 
 
The reference guide to authors states:  
 
« There are no strict requirements on reference formatting at submission. References 
can be in any style or format as long as the style is consistent » 
 
We have however downloaded the format used by Forensic Science international into 
Endnote and re-formatted reference and bibliography according to this format.  
 
We have eventually added some minor modifications throughout the text, according to 
remarks obtained from the presentation of these results in different contexts (academic 
and professional)  
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